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Abstract—This paper deals with the application of list decoding
of Reed–Solomon codes to a concatenated code for key repro-
duction using Physical Unclonable Functions. The resulting codes
achieve a higher error-correction performance at the same code
rate than known schemes in this scenario. We also show that their
decoding algorithms can be protected from side-channel attacks
on the runtime both by masking techniques and by directly
modifying the algorithms to have constant runtime.
Index Terms—Physical Unclonable Functions, Reed–Solomon
Codes, List Decoding, Side-Channel Attacks, Timing Attacks
I. INTRODUCTION
A Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is a digital circuit
that possesses an intrinsic randomness resulting from process
variations. This randomness is exploited to generate random
keys for cryptographic applications. An advantage of PUFs
over other true random number generators is their ability to
reproduce a key on demand. Thus, no embedded physically
secure non-volatile memory is needed.
However, the regeneration of a key is not perfect due to
environmental factors such as temperature variations and aging
effects of the digital circuit. These variations can be seen as an
erroneous channel and channel coding increases the reliability
of key regenerations. Error-correction methods for this purpose
were considered in [1] (repetition, Reed-Muller (RM), Golay,
BCH and concatenated codes), [2], [3] (concatenation of a
repetition and BCH code), [4]–[6] (generalized concatenated
codes using RM and Reed–Solomon (RS) codes).
So far, most publications about error correction for PUFs
have tried to find codes with low-complexity decoding meth-
ods (in time, area, etc.) and high decoding performance.
However, as for most other hardware security devices, PUFs
need to be resistant against side-channel attacks. Their purpose
is to obtain information about the secret by measurements,
such as timing, energy consumption or electromagnetic fields.
Throughout this paper, we only deal with side-channel attacks
on the runtime, often called timing attacks.
We consider RS codes in a concatenated coding scheme,
where we use list decoding in order to increase the decoding
radius beyond half the minimum distance. In this way, smaller
block error probabilities1 than the codes/decoders proposed in
[1]–[6] can be achieved.
1In PUF literature, block error probability is often called failure rate.
In addition, we protect the decoding algorithm from timing
attacks. We prove that the masking technique introduced in [7]
is information-theoretically secure and propose methods for
preventing attacks on decoders with unmasked inputs.
Section II deals with preliminaries. We propose to use
list decoding of RS codes in error correction for PUFs in
Section III and analyze their performance. Sections IV, V,
and VI present ideas of preventing timing-attacks on the list
decoding algorithm and Section VII concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMIARIES
In this paper, C = C(q;n, k, d) is a linear code over a
finite field Fq (q prime power) of length n, dimension k and
minimum distance d. If the field is clear from the context, we
write C(n, k, d). We use the classical Shannon entropy
H(X) = −
∑
x fX(x) log2(fX(x)),
where the input X is considered to be a random variable. E.g.,
if c is a codeword that is drawn uniformly at random from a
code C(n, k, d), its entropy H(c) is k.
A. Error-Correction in PUF-based Key Reproduction
We briefly describe key reproduction using PUFs with the
code-offset method2 [8], as illustrated in Figure 1. A compre-
hensive overview of PUFs and how to use error-correction for
key reproduction can be found in [3], [9], [10].
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Figure 1. Key Generation and Reproduction based on PUFs [5].
2We consider only linear codes in this paper while the code-offset method
generally also works for non-linear codes.
An initial response r ∈ Fn2 with entropy H(r) ≈ n is
generated by the PUF (I) and a random codeword c ∈ C
of a binary linear code C(n, k, d) is subtracted from r in the
Helper Data Generation (II). The resulting helper data h is
then stored in the Helper Data Storage (III) and can be made
publicly available since knowing h leaves the attacker with an
uncertainty of the choice of the codeword. More precisely, for
a uniformly drawn codeword, we obtain
H(r |h) = H(r, c)−H(h) = H(r) +H(c)−H(h)
≥ H(r)− (n− k) ≈ k.
In the reproduction phase, the PUF outputs a response
r
′ ∈ Fn2 , which differs from r by an error e whose physical
causes are environmental conditions such as temperature and
aging, and we can write r′ = r + e, where e is often3
modelled as a binary symmetric channel (BSC) with crossover
probability p (e.g., p = 0.14 in [2]).
In order to reproduce the original sequence r, the Key
Reproduction unit (IV ) subtracts the helper data from r′ and
decodes the resulting word
r
′ − h = c+ h+ e− h = c+ e
using a decoder of C and obtains a codeword cˆ. If the number
of errors wtH(e) is within the error-correction capability of
the decoder, cˆ = c and we can compute the original sequence
as r = cˆ + h. The result is then usually hashed (V ) in order
to obtain keys of length m ≤ k, which ideally are uniformly
distributed over Fm2 .
B. Reed–Solomon Codes and List Decoding
Reed–Solomon (RS) codes are algebraic codes with a variety
of applications, the largest possible minimum distance, and
efficient decoding algorithms, both for decoding up to and
beyond half the minimum distance. Let q be a prime power
and Fq be the finite field of size q and let Fq[x] denote the
polynomial ring over Fq.
Definition 1. Let α1, . . . , αn ∈ Fq be distinct. An (n, k) RS
code of dimension k < n and length n is given by the set
CRS = {(f(α1), . . . , f(αn)) : f ∈ Fq[x], deg f < k} ⊆ F
n
q .
It can be shown that the minimum distance of an (n, k)
RS code is d = n − k + 1. There are several algorithms
for uniquely decoding up to ⌊(d− 1)/2⌋ errors with RS
codes, see e.g., [13]. List decoding generalizes this concept for
τ > ⌊(d− 1)/2⌋ errors. A list decoder guarantees to return a
list of all codewords c that fulfill dH(c, r) ≤ τ for a given
decoding radius τ and the received word r. For RS codes, the
Guruswami–Sudan decoding algorithm [14] accomplishes list
decoding in polynomial time for any τ < n−
√
n(k − 1). The
algorithm is based on the following interpolation problem.
3In practice, each PUF bit exhibits a unique individual bit error rate due to
the imperfect behavior of the digital circuit. Some papers therefore consider
different channel models, cf. [11], [12].
Problem 1. Given r = (r1, . . . , rn) ∈ Fnq , find a non-zero
bivariate polynomial Q(x, y) ∈ Fq[x, y] of the form Q(x, y) =∑ℓ
j=0Qj(x)y
j
, such that for given integers s, τ and ℓ:
1) (αi, ri) are zeros of Q(x, y) of multiplicity s,
∀i = 1, . . . , n,
2) degQj(x) ≤ s(n− τ) − 1− j(k − 1), ∀j = 0, . . . , ℓ.
The multiplicity s can always be chosen large enough
such that any τ < n −
√
n(k − 1) can be achieved. The
Guruswami–Sudan algorithm returns a list of all polynomials
that satisfy (y− f(x))|Q(x, y). It was proven in [14] that this
list of polynomials includes all evaluation polynomials f(x),
which generate codewords with dH(c, r) ≤ τ . The size of
this list is bounded by a polynomial function in the code-
length whenever τ < n−
√
n(k − 1). The algorithm consists
of two main steps: the interpolation step and the root-finding
step. There are several efficient implementations, for both, the
interpolation step [15], [16] and the root-finding step [17].
Also, efficient VLSI implementations exist, e.g. [18].
C. Reed–Muller Codes
A Reed–Muller (RM) code RM(r,m) of order r with r ≤
m is a binary linear code with parameters n = 2m, k =∑r
i=0
(
m
i
)
and d = 2m−r. It can be defined recursively using
the Plotkin Construction [13]:
RM(r,m) :=
{
(a|a + b) :
a ∈ RM(r,m− 1)
b ∈ RM(r − 1,m− 1)
}
with RM(0,m) := C(2m, 1, 2m) (Repetition code) and
RM(m− 1,m) := C(2m, 2m − 1, 2) (Parity Check code) for
all m. RM codes have been proposed for PUF key reproduction
in [4], [5], [19], [20], and an efficient implementation of the
decoding algorithm in FPGAs was presented in [6].
D. Concatenated Codes
Concatenation [21] of two linear codes is a technique
for generating new codes from existing ones, while keeping
encoding and decoding complexities small.
We describe code concatenation as in [22]. Let
B(q;nb, kb, db) (inner code) and A(qkb ;na, ka, da)
(outer code) be two linear codes for a suitable choice
of q, nb, kb, db, na, ka and da. We use an encoding mapping
for the code A, i.e., an Fq-linear map θ : Fqkb → B. We
can extend the mapping to matrices by applying it row-wise:
Θ : Fna
qkb
→ Bna

a1
.
.
.
ana

 7→


θ(a1)
.
.
.
θ(ana)

 .
Definition 2 (Concatenated Code). Let A, B, na and Θ be as
above. The corresponding concatenated code is given as
CC = Θ(A) ⊆ B
na
We call the set of positions containing the ith inner
codeword θ(ai) the ith inner block. Codewords are often
represented as matrices, where the ith row contains the ith
block. Due to its construction, a concatenated code is Fq-
linear. The code has (qkb )ka = qkb·ka codewords, each of
it consisting of na many codewords from B, resulting in a
code-length of na · nb elements of Fq . Thus, the code has
parameters
CC(q;nC = na · nb, kC = kb · ka, dC),
where dC ≥ db · da is the minimum distance. Although dC
might be small, often a lot more errors than half-the-minimum
distance can be corrected. Concatenation of codes and standard
decoders have been suggested for the PUF scenario in [1], [2].
The construction can be extended to generalized concate-
nated codes [23], see also [13]. Generalized concatenated
codes were proposed for error correction in key reproduction
using PUFs in [4], [5] and a low-complexity decoding design
for FPGAs was presented in [6].
III. CODE CONSTRUCTIONS AND LIST DECODING IN THE
PUF SCENARIO
Choosing codes and decoders for error correction in key
reproduction using PUFs is subject to many constraints that
arise from their physical properties. Typical design criteria [2],
[5] are listed below.
• Choose a dimension that fulfills H(key) ≤ H(r)−n+k,
where H(key) is the desired entropy of the extracted key.
• Minimize the code-length n.
• Obtain a block error probability Perr that is below a
certain threshold (e.g., 10−9).
• Find efficient decoders (in time, area, memory, etc.).
• Provide resistance to side-channel attacks (with respect
to time, energy, electro-magnetic radiation, etc.).
In the following, we recall one of the code constructions in [5]
and show that by using list decoding we can improve the error-
correction performance of this scheme.
A. Code Construction
As in [5], we choose the inner code to be a binary Reed–
Muller code B(2;nb, kb, db) = RM(r,m) (cf. Section II-C)
and a Reed–Solomon code A(2kb ;na, ka, na − ka + 1) =
CRS(na, ka) (cf. Section II-B) as outer code.
B. Decoding
Decoding works in two steps. First, the inner blocks of the
received word are decoded using the inner RM code B. The
respective decoding result either corresponds to an element in
Fqkb or to an erasure. Afterwards, the vector containing the
decoding results of the inner blocks is decoded in the RS code.
If a list decoder (cf. Section II-B) is used in this step, more
errors can be corrected than with power decoding, which was
proposed in [5]. The following example compares our coding
scheme with known ones for the scenario considered in [1]–[5]
(BSC with p = 0.14, H(r) ≥ 128, goal Perr < 10−9).
Example 1. We consider the construction in [5, Section IV-C],
namely an inner RM code with parameters B(2; 32, 6, 16) =
RM(1, 5) and an outer RS code A(26; 64, 22, 43). The re-
sulting concatenated code has parameters CC(2; 2048, 132,≥
688). Using the algorithms proposed in [5], the resulting block
error probability is Perr ≈ 6.79 · 10−37.
Maximum likelihood decoding of the inner RM code trans-
forms the channel into a binary error and erasure channel
with P(error) = 0.003170 and P(erasure) = 0.017605 [5].
Since the minimum distance of the RS codes is d = 43, unique
decoding is possible up to 21 errors and list decoding with the
Guruswami–Sudan algorithm up to ⌈n−
√
n(k − 1)⌉−1 = 27
errors. When erasures are present, the Guruswami–Sudan
decoder simply considers only non-erased positions in the
interpolation step. Let t and ε denote the number of errors
and erasures, respectively. Then, the block error probability is
Perr =
n∑
i=0
P(ε = i)P(t ≥ n− i−
√
(n− i)(k − 1))
≈ 3.5308 · 10−46,
which is significantly smaller than for unique decoding, cf. [5].
When replacing the outer code by the RS code
CRS(2
6; 34, 22, 13), the concatenated code has parameters
CC(2; 1088, 132,≥ 208) and, using list decoding, the block
error probability is
Perr ≈ 1.9981 · 10
−10 < 10−9,
which is approximately the same as in [5] while reducing the
length of the concatenated code from 1152 to 1088.
Using generalized concatenated codes in combination with
list decoding, also the block error probability of the other code
constructions in [5] can be decreased. Since the error correc-
tion schemes in [5] decreased the block error probabilities and
code-lengths simultaneously compared to the constructions in
[1]–[4], our results also improve upon them.
C. Optimal Rates in the PUFKY [2] scenario
In general, we would like to know how close to an optimal
solution our error correction schemes are. When comparing it
to the capacity of the binary symmetric channel,
C = 1− h(p) = 1 + p log2(p) + (1− p) log2(1− p),
one will notice that the rates of most of the existing schemes
are far away from this upper bound, which is expectable
for finite block lengths. It was proven in [24, Theorem 52]
that the maximal achievable rate R∗(n, p,Perr) of a code of
length n whose codewords are transmitted through a BSC with
crossover probability 0 < p < 12 with maximal block error
probability Perr is
R∗(n, p,Perr) = C −
√
V
n
Q−1(Perr) +
log
2
n
2n +O(
1
n
),
where
V = p(1− p) log22
(
1−p
p
)
, Q(x) =
∫ ∞
x
1√
2π
e−
y2
2 dy.
In [2], [4], [5], a BSC with crossover probability p = 0.14
was considered and Perr < 10−9 was demanded. In this case,
the capacity of the BSC is C ≈ 0.5842, but the actual maximal
achievable rates R∗ are much smaller. Table I shows how
close the rates of existing code constructions and of our new
construction are to the optimal rates.
Table I
COMPARISON BETWEEN CODE CONSTRUCTIONS AND DECODERS FOR
PUFS BASED ON CONCATENATED CODES.
A/B (ref.) Perr k n R R∗ R/R∗
BCH/Rep. [2] 1.0 · 10−9 174 2226 0.0782 0.3027 0.2582
RS/RMu [5] 1.2 · 10−10 132 1152 0.1146 0.2506 0.4573
RS/RMℓ,t 2.0 · 10−10 132 1088 0.1213 0.2481 0.4890
Legend: Outer code B, inner code A, block error probability Perr , rate R =
k/n, maximal possible rate R∗(n, 0.14,Perr), ratio to optimality R/R∗ .
uDecoder based on unique decoding of the RS code (cf. [5]). ℓDecoder based
on list decoding of the RS code (cf. Section II-B). tThis paper.
We conclude that using list decoding, the error-correction
capabilities of (generalized) concatenated code constructions
based on outer RS codes can be improved significantly. Also,
the coding schemes achieve approximately half of the maxi-
mum possible rates in the scenario considered in [2], which
is a large value for a practical coding scheme. However, this
gain comes at the cost of increased time and space complexity
and therefore a larger power and area consumption.
IV. PREVENTING TIMING ATTACKS
This section deals with securing the decoding algorithms of
the code constructions considered in this paper against side-
channel attacks on the runtime. A side-channel attacker tries
to obtain information from the hardware implementation of
the PUF, which includes runtime, power consumption, and
electromagnetic radiation. For example, ring oscillator PUFs
compare the frequencies of two ring oscillators and therefore
inevitably induce an electro-magnetic emission depending on
their frequencies that leads to side information [25]. The
paper [25] deals with side-channel attacks on the helper data.
In [7], it was proposed to add another random codeword
(called codeword masking) on the helper data before the key
reproduction. In [26], it was analyzed how much information is
leaked from the power consumption when storing a codeword
of a single-parity check code in a static memory.
However, to the best of our knowledge, there are no pub-
lications that focus on attacking the decoding process itself,
e.g., the runtime and power consumption while executing the
decoding algorithm. It is therefore important that a decoder
has constant runtime and constant power consumption, inde-
pendent of the received word. In the following, we design a
list decoder with constant runtime.4
We focus on side-channel attacks of the decoding algorithm.
Therefore, assume that only parts of the key reconstruction
functions are attackable, as illustrated in Figure 2.
4Unlike most publications in the field of side-channel attacks, we do not
provide an FPGA implementation, but analyze our algorithm theoretically.
Measuring the side-channel attack resilience of such an implementation is a
necessary step for further research.
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Figure 2. Attacker Model.
The PUF (I) and the Helper Data Generation (II) are
assumed to be secure here. As mentioned before, the Helper
Data Storage (III) can be read by an attacker without obtain-
ing more information about r than contained in the random
choice of c. Compared to the model in Figure 1, the Key
Reproduction unit is subdivided into Preprocessing (IV ), the
Decoder (V ), and the Post-Processing unit (V I). The latter
also includes the hashing of the key here. Preprocessing (IV )
is assumed to be not attackable. We distinguish two types of
preprocessing:
1) Classical preprocessing: Compute c + e = r′ − h and
hand it over to the Decoding (V ) unit.
2) Masking: Choose random function ϕ such that the
decoder can map ϕ(c+e) into ϕ(c), but even if ϕ(c+e)
can be obtained by an attacker, the uncertainty about r
is not decreased.
The Decoder (V ) can be attacked. In the Post-Processing unit
(V I), we compute ϕ−1(ϕ(cˆ)) + h = cˆ+ h. If decoding was
successful, we obtain the original response cˆ+h = c+h = r.
The key is then often computed as a hash of r [2].
V. ATTACK RESISTANCE BY MASKING
A. Codeword Masking
One method to hide the actual codeword c from an attacker
who can retrieve the processed data ϕ(c+ e) is the codeword
masking technique proposed in [7], where a random codeword
c
′ is chosen and added to c+ e, i.e.,
ϕ(c + e) = c′ + c+ e.
The technique is based on general masking schemes for
preventing DPAs. In [7], no proof was given that the method
actually masks well. The following theorem proves that even
if an attacker is able to retrieve both the helper data h and
the masked word c′+ c+ e, the remaining uncertainty is still
large enough.
Theorem 1. H(r | (c′ + c+ e,h)) ≥ H(r)− (n− k)
Proof. We know that r, c, c′, e are pairwise independent.
Also, c and c′ are uniformly drawn from the code, so
H(c+ e) = H(c+ c′ + e). (1)
In general, it holds that
H(c+ c′ + e,h) ≤ H(c+ c′ + e) +H(h). (2)
Since we can compute (r, c′+c+e, c) from (r, c′+c+e,h)
and vice versa, we have
H(r, c′ + c+ e,h) = H(r, c′ + c+ e, c)
= H(r | (c′ + c+ e, c)) +H(c′ + c+ e, c)
= H(r) +H(c′ + c+ e, c)
= H(r) +H(c′ + c+ e | c) +H(c)
= H(r) +H(c′ + e) +H(c) (3)
Hence, we obtain
H(r | (c′ + c+ e,h))
= H(r, c′ + c+ e,h)−H(c′ + c+ e,h)
(2),(3)
≥ H(r) +H(c′ + e) +H(c)−H(c+ c′ + e)−H(h)
(1)
= H(r) +H(c)−H(h) = H(r) + k −H(h)
≥ H(r)− (n− k).
Note that if H(r) = n, then H(r | (c′ + c + e,h)) ≥ k.
B. Alternative Masking Techniques
Other than adding a codeword to the processed word, the
only masking operations that do not change the Hamming
weight of the error (i.e., the hardness of the decoding problem)
are the Hamming-metric isometries. Over Fn2 , those are exactly
all permutations of positions since the other possibility, the
Frobenius automorphism ·2, is the identity map in F2.
In the case of RS codes, the decoder can handle a permuta-
tion π of positions since π(c) is also a codeword of an RS code
with permuted code locators αi. Thus, π(c+e) = π(c)+π(e)
with wtH(π(e)) = wtH(e), we can obtain π(c) from π(c+e)
using a decoder for Reed–Solomon codes whenever it is
possible to correct e in c+ e.
Note that if π is not an element of the automorphism group
of the code, the decoder must know the permutation π. If it is
in the automorphism group, then π(c)− c is a codeword and
the method is equivalent to codeword masking.
VI. ATTACK RESISTANCE BY CONSTANT RUNTIME
(CLASSICAL PREPROCESSING)
A. Realizing Finite Field Operations
The codes used in Section III can be decoded using al-
gebraic decoding algorithms that perform operations in finite
fields. For error-correction in key regeneration using PUFs, we
usually consider fields of characteristic 2, i.e., F2m for some
m ∈ N. Motivated by elliptic-curve cryptography, operations
in these fields have recently been made resistant against
timing-attacks while preserving sufficient speed in [27]. For
small fields, lookup tables could be used. E.g., the field F26
used in the construction in Section III would require tables of
26·2 = 4096 entries.
Based on these considerations, we assume that field opera-
tions in F2m , also if a zero is involved, are constant in runtime.
B. Outer Code: List Decoding of RS Codes
1) Interpolation step: The interpolation step consists of
finding a bivariate polynomial
Q(x, y) =
∑ℓ
η=0Qη(x)y
η =
∑ℓ
η=0
∑dη
µ=0Qη,µx
µyη,
where dη = s(n−τ)−1−η(k−1), satisfying properties 1)-2)
of Problem 1. This corresponds to finding a non-zero solution
Qη,µ ∈ Fq for 0 ≤ µ ≤ dη and 0 ≤ η ≤ ℓ of the system∑ℓ
η=0
∑dη
µ=0
(
η
h
)(
µ
j
)
Qη,µα
µ−j
i r
η−h
i = 0
with i = 0, . . . , n and h+ j < s.
There are many efficient algorithms for finding such a solu-
tion which are asymptotically faster than simply solving this
system without considering its structure. However, these fast
methods might reveal side-information about the processed
data since their runtime depends on the received word r.
Therefore, we propose to solve the system using “naive”
Gaussian elimination where we always apply a row operation,
even when an element is already zero (simply add a zero row to
it). The resulting algorithm always performs the same number
of field additions and multiplications and therefore its running
time does not reveal any information about the processed data.
2) Root-Finding Step: Root-finding can be performed by
a modification of the Roth–Ruckenstein algorithm [17]. The
algorithm is outlined in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: RR(M(x, y), g(x), i,L)
Input: M(x, y) =
∑ℓ
η=0
Mη(x)y
η
, g(x), i, global list L
1 if i=k then return
2 M(x, y)← Q(x, y)/xr with r ∈ N maximal
3 p(y)←M(0, y)
4 Find roots of p(y)
5 Remove g(x) from the global list L
6 for each root γ do
7 Add g(x) + γxi to the global list L
8 RR
(
M(x, x(y − γ)), g(x) + γxi, i+ 1,L
)
We need to modify the algorithm slightly as follows:
• We compute the i-th recursion step of all recursive calls
before starting to compute the (i+1)-th recursion depth.
• After finishing all recursion steps at depth i, fill the list L
with random univariate polynomials of degree ≤ i such
that the list always contains ℓ(k − 1) polynomials and
mark them as random within the global list L.
• At depth (i+1), RR is called for all elements of L with
the corresponding bivariate polynomial M(x, x(y − γ)).
If the element is random, also call the algorithm with a
random bivariate polynomial of y-degree ≤ ℓ but do not
save the results in L.
The output L of the modified algorithm without the random
entries equals exactly the output of the Roth–Ruckenstein
algorithm, so its correctness follows.
Theorem 2. Consider Algorithm 1 with above modifications.
RR(Q(x, y), 0, 0, {0}) calls RR(·) exactly ℓ2(k − 1) times.
Proof. The original Roth–Ruckenstein algorithm calls itself ≤
ℓ(k−1) times [17], so the number of non-random entries of L
will never be ≥ ℓ(k−1). At recursion depth i, for i = 1, . . . , k,
RR(·) is called exactly ℓ(k−1) times since |L| = ℓ(k−1).
Theorem 3. The number of multiplications and additions
needed by Algorithm 1 for fixed parameters is independent
of Q(x, y).
Proof. Due to lack of space, we only give the idea: We know
that deg p(y) ≤ ℓ, so evaluation corresponds to ℓ+1 multipli-
cations and ℓ additions of field elements. Root finding in p(y)
can be done by evaluating it at all elements of Fq. In recursion
depth i, degMη(x) ≤ maxµ{degQµ} + ℓi, so computing
M(x, x(y−γ)) can be done in constant time since we can treat
Mη(x) as a polynomial of degree exactly maxµ{degQµ}+ℓi.
Finding r is a matter of data structures. Obtaining Q(x, y)/xr
and M(0, y) requires no computation.
Thus, the modified Roth–Ruckenstein algorithm always
performs the same number of field operations and can be con-
sidered to be resilient against timing attacks, cf. Section VI-A.
C. Inner Codes: Reed–Muller Codes
For codes of small cardinality kb, as often used as inner
codes, maximum likelihood decoding can used, e.g., by finding
the minimum of the Hamming distances hi = dH(c + e, ci)
of the received word c + e, with c ∈ B and error e, to
all codewords ci for i = 1, . . . , 2kb . In order to not reveal
information about c, the hi must be carefully computed.
Let π be a random permutation of the indices {1, . . . , 2kb}
and (hπ(1), . . . , hπ(2kb )) be the ordered list of Hamming dis-
tances of the received word to the permuted list of codewords.
We can prove the following theorem that states that even if
the ordered list of Hamming distances can be extracted by an
attacker, the uncertainty of the codeword does not decrease.
Theorem 4. H(c | (hπ(1), . . . , hπ(2kb))) = H(c).
Proof. Since hπ(i) = dH(c + e, cπ(i)) = dH(c′ + c + e, c′ +
cπ(i)) for any codeword c′ ∈ B and we can define another
permutation π′ such that cπ′(i) = c′+cπ(i) (adding a codeword
is a bijection on the code), hπ(i) = dH(c′ + c+ e, cπ′(i)), so
the uncertainty of choosing a codeword c′ remains.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented decoding algorithms for
key reproduction using PUFs that both achieve larger decoding
performance than existing ones and are resistant against side-
channel attacks on the runtime. Both, list recovery [28] and
the Kötter–Vardy algorithm [29], a soft-decision variant of
the Guruswami–Sudan algorithm, promise a further large gain
in decoding performance. Investigating the capability to use
them for PUFs is work in progress. Moreover, it is necessary
to prevent differential power analysis (DPA) attacks on the
decoding step, e.g., by combining our methods with DPA-
resistant logic styles, see [30] and references therein.
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